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NOTES
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND BARS: APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLES OF STRICT SCRUTINY WHEN SENTENCING
JUVENILES TRIED AS ADULTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. STATE OF JUVENILE SENTENCING TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Juveniles . . . . . . . .
B. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Inadequacy of Eighth Amendment Protections . . . .
II. OVERVIEW OF TRANSFER LAWS AND HB 744 . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Overview of Transfer Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Background of HB 744 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. CAROLENE PRODUCTS’ FOOTNOTE FOUR AND SUSPECT
CLASSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. History of Suspect Classifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Arguments for an Expansion of Suspect or
Quasi-Suspect Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Juvenile Offenders as a Suspect Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Juvenile Offenders Have Faced Historical
Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Juvenile Offenders Experience Political
Powerlessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Juvenile Offenders Share Immutable Traits. . . . . . . .
IV. APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY DURING JUVENILE
SENTENCING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Determining a Compelling Governmental Interest. . . . .
B. Determining a Narrowly Tailored Sentence . . . . . . . . . .
C. Appellate Review of Sentences Under HB 744 . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1765

1766
1768
1768
1769
1771
1773
1773
1774
1775
1776
1778
1780
1781
1783
1787
1789
1790
1792
1794
1795

1766

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1765

INTRODUCTION
“Our most important task as a nation is to make sure all our
young people can achieve their dreams.”1 These words, as part of a
strong message from President Barack Obama, came with a call on
the United States to create better futures for children across the
country.2 Indeed, such a call to action by the President was not unfounded.
Beginning in the 1990s, the emergence of the “tough on crime” era
resulted in years of draconian punishments that left many young
people behind bars, robbing them of their futures.3 The “tough on
crime” era started as a direct result of the widespread fear that
violent juvenile crime rates were on the rise.4 This fear prompted
state legislatures to enact harsh sentencing laws that instituted
mandatory minimum and life imprisonment without parole (LWOP)
sentences on juveniles.5 At the same time, states across the country
were passing transfer laws that mandated or allowed prosecutors to
try juveniles as adults, opening the door for these children to be
prosecuted in adult criminal courts.6 Although these sentencing
laws were passed over twenty years ago, their legacy continues
today.
Unfortunately, only a few states have addressed the intersection
between mandatory minimum sentences and juvenile transfers to
adult criminal courts.7 The Commonwealth of Virginia was the first
in the nation to pass legislation that provides judges with the
discretion to veer away from the mandatory minimum sentence and
1. Barack Obama (@BarackObama), TWITTER (Mar. 19, 2018, 5:48 PM), https://twitter.
com/BarackObama/status/975851480648421376 [https://perma.cc/W9WS-RZEZ].
2. See id.
3. Kallee Spooner & Michael S. Vaughn, Sentencing Juvenile Homicide Offenders: A 50State Survey, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 130, 132-33 (2017).
4. Id. at 132.
5. Id.
6. See PATRICK GRIFFIN, SEAN ADDIE, BENJAMIN ADAMS & KATHY FIRESTINE, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND
REPORTING 1 (2011).
7. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 (Iowa 2014) (“[T]he Iowa Constitution
forbids a mandatory minimum sentencing schema for juvenile offenders that deprives the
district court of the discretion to consider youth and its attendant circumstances as a
mitigating factor.”).
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to impose trauma-informed and age-appropriate sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of felonies and tried as adults.8 Although
Virginia’s new law, House Bill 744 (HB 744), is a pioneering step in
the right direction,9 this Note argues that the law may now provide
judges with too much discretion. In other words, HB 744 alone,
without more guidance, does not go far enough to protect the rights
of juvenile offenders.
Therefore, this Note proposes a new judicial policy to guide judges
in Virginia, before they exercise their discretion to sentence a juvenile offender in adult court. Judges operating under the proposed
standard must adopt the principles of strict scrutiny when deciding
the individual sentence of a juvenile offender tried as an adult.
Accordingly, judges must ensure that their sentences are narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.10 This Note
argues that juvenile offenders are a suspect class under Carolene
Products’ Footnote Four,11 and thereby deserve such heightened
scrutiny12 over the judicial review of laws that affect their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
Simply put, if judges fail to abide by the principles of strict scrutiny
when deciding upon a sentence, appellate judges must strike the
sentence down as unconstitutional if the sentence is subsequently
appealed.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief background on the current state of juvenile sentencing in the United
States. Specifically, this Part discusses mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders and the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence over the issue. Folded into this Part is an argument
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(D) (2021); see also Vivian Watts, Justice System Reforms
Will Help Protect Children, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (May 6, 2020, 12:05 AM), https://www.pilot
online.com/opinion/columns/vp-ed-column-watts-0506-20200506-huanalzapfehxfyfiyk3rakou4story.html [https://perma.cc/HT5L-V2AW].
9. See Watts, supra note 8.
10. See Sonu Bedi, Collapsing Suspect Class with Suspect Classification: Why Strict
Scrutiny Is Too Strict and Maybe Not Strict Enough, 47 GA. L. REV. 301, 303 (2013).
11. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that
there are some classifications of people that deserve “a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry” when laws are seemingly prejudicial against them).
12. See Bedi, supra note 10, at 303 n.1 (explaining that heightened scrutiny “mean[s] any
kind of scrutiny greater than rational review”).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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about why the Supreme Court’s invocation of the Eighth Amendment alone is not enough to protect the rights of juvenile offenders.
Part II provides a brief overview of transfer laws across the country
and introduces HB 744 in greater detail. This Part then explains
how the bill changes current Virginia law. Part III introduces Carolene Products’ Footnote Four and explores how courts apply the
principles of the historic footnote. This Part then explains why juvenile offenders fall under Footnote Four’s conception of a protected
class that is awarded strict scrutiny. Lastly, Part IV discusses how
the principles of strict scrutiny may be applied when judges exercise
their discretion under HB 744 and how appellate judges should
review sentences under this Note’s proposed standard.
I. STATE OF JUVENILE SENTENCING TODAY
This Part first provides a brief overview of mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles. Next, a discussion of recent Supreme Court
cases illustrates the Court’s modern attempts to reform the state of
juvenile sentencing. The final Section examines why the Eighth
Amendment alone is inadequate for protecting juveniles tried as
adults.
A. Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Juveniles
HB 744 is a trailblazing piece of legislation because it allows
judges in Virginia to veer away from the mandatory minimum when
sentencing a juvenile in adult court.14 A mandatory minimum sentence is the least amount of time an individual convicted of a
specific crime can be sentenced to.15 In other words, a mandatory
minimum sentence removes most judicial discretion and mandates
that the law alone determines the punishment that the individual
receives.16 While mandatory minimum sentences were devised to

14. See Watts, supra note 8.
15. James Cullen, Sentencing Laws and How They Contribute to Mass Incarceration,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/sentencing-laws-and-how-they-contribute-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/68ZCDKDJ].
16. Id.
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create a fairer justice system, they have, in contrast, led to more
inequitable sentences.17
According to a fifty-state survey on juvenile sentencing conducted
in 2017, thirty-nine states still permit mandatory minimum sentences of some form for juvenile homicide offenders.18 By far, the
most severe mandatory minimum available is mandatory LWOP.19
The high number of people20 serving juvenile LWOP sentences has
also proven to be costly.21 Fortunately, these costs have been somewhat mitigated by a string of Supreme Court cases beginning in
2005 and culminating in 2016 with the Court’s ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana, in which the Court invalidated all existing juvenile
LWOP sentences that were imposed as a result of a mandatory
minimum statute.22
B. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has instituted
much-needed juvenile sentencing reform on its own. Recent cases
have invalidated state laws that were found to be too harsh on juvenile offenders.23 Notably, the Court began to recognize the differences in culpability between juvenile and adult offenders and the
need for these differences to be considered during sentencing.24 The
Court also reinforced the importance of judicial discretion and

17. See id. (“Mandatory minimums often apply to nonviolent drug offenders, forcing judges
to harshly punish those who pose the least physical danger to communities.”).
18. Spooner & Vaughn, supra note 3, at 151.
19. See id. at 132.
20. In 2017, an estimated two thousand people were serving LWOP sentences for crimes
committed when they were juveniles. See id. at 132-33.
21. For example, assuming LWOP sentences last longer when imposed upon juveniles
compared to adults, one juvenile’s fifty-year sentence could possibly cost taxpayers around
$2.25 million. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENT’G PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN
OVERVIEW 4 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-pa
role/ [https://perma.cc/BQB3-9NYH].
22. See id. at 1-3; Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016).
23. See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing
Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 263-64
(2013).
24. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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individualized sentencing in striking down mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.25
Three Supreme Court cases in particular were chiefly responsible
for the “juvenile justice revolution in America.”26 Professor Cara
Drinan refers to these cases as “the Miller trilogy.”27 First, in Roper
v. Simmons, the Court proscribed states from imposing the death
penalty on offenders under the age of eighteen.28 In reaching this
landmark decision, the Court held that juveniles, as compared to
adults, (i) possess an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (ii) are
more vulnerable to negative influences and external pressures, and
(iii) lack fully developed characters and personality traits.29 Scholars refer to these differences in culpability as the “diminished responsibility rationale.”30
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional for states to impose LWOP sentences on juvenile
offenders convicted of non-homicide offenses.31 Graham further
emphasized that children are assumed to have reduced culpability
even when their crimes involve no intent to take the life of another.32 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court reaffirmed that “children
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing”33 and declared as unconstitutional mandatory LWOP sentences
for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide.34 The Court found that
25. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).
26. See Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1788 (2016).
27. Id. at 1789.
28. 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005) (“[W]ith respect to juveniles under 16 ... the Eighth
Amendment prohibit[s] the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles below that age. We
conclude the same reasoning applies to all juvenile offenders under 18.” (citation omitted));
see also Feld, supra note 23, at 263 (“The Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons prohibited
states from executing offenders for murders committed when younger than eighteen years of
age.”).
29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
30. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 23, at 263.
31. 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (“This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.”); see also
Feld, supra note 23, at 263.
32. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”:
Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 78 (2013).
33. 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
34. Id. at 479 (“We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”); see
also Feld, supra note 23, at 264.
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the lack of discretion associated with mandatory LWOP sentences
prevents judges from considering a juvenile’s “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,”35 thus
“pos[ing] too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.”36 More
importantly, the Miller Court unequivocally declared that LWOP
sentences for juveniles should be “uncommon.”37 In summary, it is
implicit from the Miller trilogy that judges must engage in a “proportionality analysis” before deciding upon a juvenile’s sentence.38
A few years after Miller, the Court’s decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana required states to conduct individualized mitigation
inquiries before LWOP sentences could be imposed.39 However, the
ruling only requires states to hold sentencing hearings to “separate
those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from
those who may not.”40 In other words, these hearings merely identify
the juveniles “whose crimes reflect [the] permanent incorrigibility”
that warrants a life sentence.41 Such safeguards are undoubtedly
crucial for protecting those children facing life sentences. But, they
do not solve the more widespread problem of mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles tried as adults.42
C. The Inadequacy of Eighth Amendment Protections
There is no doubt that the Miller trilogy prompted states across
the country to reevaluate their own sentencing laws to reflect the
idea that children are different from adults.43 In reaching these
critical decisions, however, the Court relied almost exclusively
on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
35. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477.
36. Id. at 479.
37. See id.
38. See Scott, supra note 32, at 72. Such an analysis should invoke “behavioral and
neurobiological research to delineate the attributes of adolescence that distinguish teenage
offending from adult criminal activity.” Id.
39. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
40. Id. at 735.
41. Id. at 734.
42. See Spooner & Vaughn, supra note 3, at 151.
43. See id. at 153; see also Drinan, supra note 26, at 1788 (“Legislatures, courts and
executive actors are reconsidering the propriety of criminal laws as they apply to children in
fundamental ways.”).
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punishment.44 For example, the Graham Court stated that “the
Eighth Amendment bars ... punishments that are disproportionate
to the crime committed.”45 With regards to proportionality, the
Court in Miller reaffirmed that criminal procedure laws must consider a defendant’s youthfulness to pass constitutional muster.46
While the Miller trilogy represents an unprecedented invocation
of the Eighth Amendment to protect juveniles,47 its application is
nonetheless limited. Though Miller mandated individualized consideration before a juvenile is sentenced to LWOP, theoretically,
juveniles convicted of homicide could still receive LWOP even after
such a hearing.48 Thus, it has been suggested that the Miller trilogy
simply provided some boundaries within which juveniles can receive
the law’s harshest sentence without violating the Eighth Amendment.49 Still, some state courts have found that a child’s Eighth
Amendment rights are not violated when sentenced to the LWOP
mandatory minimum.50
Hence, while Miller facilitated reform that was not possible
before,51 this Note argues that the Eighth Amendment alone does
not protect the large number of juveniles who are not being sentenced to LWOP or similarly harsh punishments. In other words,
every time juveniles are prosecuted as adults,52 greater protections
should be instituted to ensure that children are indeed afforded
individualized consideration due to the differences in culpability

44. See Scott, supra note 32, at 72 (“Three times in the past seven years the Supreme
Court has held that imposing harsh criminal sentences on juvenile offenders violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.”). It is worth noting that
the Court also invoked the Fourteenth Amendment in these cases, but did so just to explain
that the Eighth Amendment was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
45. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
46. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473-74 (2012) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 76).
47. See Scott, supra note 32, at 81 (“Graham represents the only occasion on which the
Court has categorically banned a sentence other than death on Eighth Amendment grounds.”).
48. Id. at 76, 81.
49. See Drinan, supra note 26, at 1803.
50. See, e.g., State v. Taylor G., 110 A.3d 338, 345 (Conn. 2015).
51. See Drinan, supra note 26, at 1803.
52. See Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws,
NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F546-ZUSK] (discussing states’ abilities to prosecute juveniles as adults).

2022]

NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND BARS

1773

between them and adults.53 Therefore, even in states where juveniles are no longer subjected to mandatory minimum sentences
when tried as adults, there must be other constitutional protections
over the rights of juvenile offenders during sentencing in general,
particularly after being transferred to adult court.
II. OVERVIEW OF TRANSFER LAWS AND HB 744
This Part details how transfer laws enable states to charge juveniles as adults. It then examines Virginia’s own transfer laws before
explaining how HB 744 changes the way judges can sentence juveniles tried as adults in the Commonwealth.
A. Overview of Transfer Laws
Currently, all fifty states have transfer laws that allow or mandate juvenile offenders to be tried in adult court for committing
serious crimes.54 These transfer laws apply regardless of a juvenile’s
age.55 By far, the most common form of transfer law provides
juvenile courts the discretion, often after a prosecutor’s motion, to
waive juvenile jurisdiction.56 As noted in Miller, there is cause for
concern when judges or prosecutors are given broad discretion during the transfer process.57 Such concern partially stems from the
fact that judges are not given the full picture of a juvenile’s unique
circumstances during the pretrial stages.58
After Miller, several states responded by enacting meaningful
reform.59 In 2020, eight years after Miller was decided, there was
still momentum among the states in favor of reform.60 For example,
Virginia increased the age at which a prosecutor can directly charge
53. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
54. Teigen, supra note 52.
55. Id.
56. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
57. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 487-88 (2012).
58. Id. at 488.
59. See Drinan, supra note 26, at 1816.
60. See Brian Evans, It’s Not All Bad. Really..., CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. (Mar. 13,
2020), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/news/blog/item/it-s-not-all-bad-really [https://
perma.cc/Y6FR-LCWC] (“[G]ood legislation to reduce the number of children transferred to
the adult court ... has started to move in state legislatures.”).
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a juvenile in adult criminal court.61 While much work has been done
to keep juveniles out of the adult system, presently, juveniles may
still be charged in adult court in all fifty states.62 Moreover, few
states have addressed whether juveniles may also be subject to
mandatory minimum sentences once they are transferred to adult
court,63 and a majority of states still allow mandatory minimums
for juveniles convicted of homicide.64 Therefore, this Note focuses on
the protections that juveniles should receive when tried as adults in
criminal courts by using Virginia sentencing laws as an example.
B. Background of HB 744
In Virginia, once a juvenile is transferred to adult court, he or she
faces the possibility of higher sentences and the likelihood of being
sent to adult prison.65 When HB 744 was passed in March 2020,
Virginia became the first state in the nation to allow judges to
depart from the mandatory minimum sentence when sentencing
juveniles in adult court.66 The new law provides courts the discretion to “depart from any mandatory minimum sentence required by
law”67 and requires judges to “consider (i) the juvenile's exposure to
adverse childhood experiences, early childhood trauma, or any child
welfare agency and (ii) the differences between juvenile and adult
offenders.”68 According to the author of the bill, Delegate Vivian
Watts, at the time of the bill’s passage, approximately 90 percent of
children tied up in the criminal justice system had experienced a
minimum of two traumatic events during their early childhood.69
61. Id.
62. See Teigen, supra note 52.
63. See QUINNIPIAC U. SCH. OF L. JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, ENDING MANDATORY MINIMUM
SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 2-3 (2020), https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/wp-content/up
loads/model_reforms_ending_mandatory_minimums_for_children.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8HMB-NE76] (providing only five examples of state legislatures addressing the issue).
64. See Spooner & Vaughn, supra note 3, at 151.
65. M. Randell Scism, Comment, Children Are Different: The Need for Reform of Virginia's
Juvenile Transfer Laws, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 445, 452-53 (2019). In Virginia, there are
three ways to transfer a juvenile to adult court: (1) judicial discretionary waiver; (2) certification; and (3) mandatory waiver. Id. at 448.
66. See Watts, supra note 8.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(A)(3) (2021).
68. Id. § 16.1-272(D).
69. Watts, supra note 8.
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With such jarring statistics in mind, Delegate Watts authored HB
744 to allow judges to consider a minor’s exposure to adverse childhood experiences, and the resulting trauma, before imposing a
sentence.70 Put differently, HB 744 provides judges with full discretion to depart from any mandatory minimum sentence that
would have applied to adults when sentencing a juvenile in adult
court.71
While HB 744 created a “paradigm shift”72 in juvenile sentencing
laws in Virginia, this Note argues that it does not go far enough.
Delegate Watts herself admitted that the new law still allows judges
to impose the statutory minimum, so long as the court considers the
juvenile’s trauma and childhood experiences before sentencing.73
Such discretion, even after a mandated “consideration,” still gives
judges too much leeway to impose comparatively harsher sentences
on juveniles transferred to adult court. Therefore, while HB 744
gives judges new freedom to veer away from the mandatory
minimum, judges have to be given more guidance while exercising
their discretion during sentencing. To provide such guidance, this
Note argues that Virginia judges must henceforth apply the principles of strict scrutiny when sentencing juveniles tried in adult
court. In other words, judges must apply the standard awarded to
suspect classes and ensure that their sentences are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.74
III. CAROLENE PRODUCTS’ FOOTNOTE FOUR AND SUSPECT CLASSES
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”75 The idea that the Equal Protection
Clause affords some classifications of individuals more rigorous
review than others is drawn from Footnote Four of the Supreme

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bedi, supra note 10, at 303.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Court’s United States v. Carolene Products Co. decision.76 This Part
first explains the history behind suspect classes. It then explores
the possibility of additional suspect classes and why juvenile offenders must be considered a suspect class.
A. History of Suspect Classifications
Footnote Four of the Carolene Products decision (henceforth
referred to as “Footnote Four”) is unequivocally the most wellknown footnote in all of constitutional law.77 Footnote Four famously invokes the idea that “discrete and insular minorities”
should be awarded a more “searching judicial inquiry” over laws
that infringe upon their rights due to the fact that these groups are
unable to partake in the political process.78 Such limitations on
political participation might be a direct result of the minority
group’s diminished capacity to form political alliances with larger
groups within the political process, thereby rendering them politically powerless.79 Thus, the footnote established the foundation
for judicial review of “legislation which affects those ... for whom the
democratic process does not work fairly.”80 In such instances, the
“courts have a duty to step in to end the unfair treatment.”81
Unfortunately, the revolutionary footnote “did not specify what
precisely constituted such a minority” group that deserved heightened scrutiny.82 It was equally uncertain whether a failure of the
political process to protect such minority groups was dispositive to
warrant special consideration, or if evidence of affirmative prejudice
was also necessary for such protections.83 Eventually, the Supreme
Court introduced “suspect classifications” of groups that warrant

76. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 143
(2011).
77. See Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products
Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004).
78. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
79. See Heather L. McKay, Note, Fighting for Victoria: Federal Equal Protection Claims
Available to American Transgender Schoolchildren, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493, 504 (2011).
80. Gilman, supra note 77, at 165-66.
81. McKay, supra note 79, at 504.
82. Strauss, supra note 76, at 144.
83. Id.
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strict judicial scrutiny.84 Such examples include race, national
origin, alienage, and illegitimacy.85 Classifications based on race
were the first to be deemed suspect.86 A few years later, in Graham
v. Richardson, the Supreme Court extended suspect class status to
aliens,87 but neglected to expound on its reasons for doing so.88
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance, a list of
relevant, but not exhaustive, factors for determining suspect classifications has been inferred from the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence on the matter.89 These factors are: (i) evidence of prejudice
or historical discrimination suffered by the class; (ii) political powerlessness signaling the class’s inability to effect change through political means; and (iii) the immutability of the class’s particular defining trait.90 The more factors that a group meets, the more likely
the reviewing court will find the group to be a suspect class and
subject their equal protection claims to strict scrutiny.91 If only some
factors are met, there is a possibility that the group will be considered quasi-suspect instead,92 subjecting its equal protection claims
to only intermediate scrutiny.93 With these factors in mind, several
arguments have been made regarding the possibility of other groups
being awarded suspect or quasi-suspect status.

84. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973).
85. Id. at 61 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Selene C. Vázquez, Note, The Equal
Protection Clause & Suspect Classifications: Children of Undocumented Entrants, 51 U. MIA.
INTER-AM. L. REV. 63, 88 (2020).
86. Vázquez, supra note 85, at 75 (“The first established suspect classification ... was
race.”). In Korematsu v. United States, the Court definitively declared that classifications
based on race were “immediately suspect” and subject to “the most rigid scrutiny.” 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944). Later, in McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court reaffirmed that racial classifications were “constitutionally suspect.” 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
87. 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens ... are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’
minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” (citation omitted)).
88. See Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2006).
89. See, e.g., Vázquez, supra note 85, at 80. Scholars have also referred to these factors
as the “traditional indicia of suspectness.” Geiger, supra note 88, at 1206.
90. Vázquez, supra note 85, at 80; see also Geiger, supra note 88, at 1206.
91. Vázquez, supra note 85, at 80.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 72. For example, gender is a quasi-suspect classification. Strauss, supra note
76, at 146. Under intermediate scrutiny, “the Court asks if the law is substantially related to
an important governmental purpose.” Bedi, supra note 10, at 303.
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B. Arguments for an Expansion of Suspect or Quasi-Suspect
Classifications
Experts frequently lobby for more groups to be awarded suspect
or quasi-suspect status. Ex-offenders have been identified as a
possible group that should be treated as a suspect class that
receives heightened scrutiny.94 Central to this argument is the fact
that ex-offenders, as a class, have historically faced discrimination
in the United States.95 Furthermore, significant societal barriers
prevent ex-offenders from disassociating from their label96 and
partaking in the political process through voting.97
Attempts have also been made to classify youths under the age of
eighteen as a suspect class because of their inability to vote.98
Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue,99 Justice
Thurgood Marshall wrote in his concurring opinion in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. that he was “not aware of any
suggestion that legislation affecting [minors] be viewed with the
suspicion of heightened scrutiny.”100 Lower courts have suggested
that children, in general, do not qualify as a suspect class without
a greater showing of the “need [for] extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process.”101 As a result, there is a possibility that children who share certain characteristics may be awarded
heightened scrutiny.
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court contemplated such a possibility when the Court invalidated a Texas law that gave local school
districts the authority to deny undocumented children access to free
public education.102 Because the law outwardly discriminated
94. See Geiger, supra note 88, at 1193 (“[A] reasonable interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause demands that ex-offenders be accorded suspect status.”).
95. Id. at 1225. For example, before the 1960s, several laws prevented ex-offenders from
making contracts or suing in civil court. Id.
96. See id. at 1224. Laws allowing ex-offenders to erase a criminal conviction from their
criminal history are only available in fewer than half the states. See id. at 1219.
97. See id. at 1191.
98. See, e.g., Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
99. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 181 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2003).
100. 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Brown, 589 F. Supp. at 991. The court found that children, simply by virtue of their
age, do not belong to a group that has faced “a history of purposeful or unequal treatment” or
has been subjected to “unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics.” Id.
102. 457 U.S. 202, 205, 230 (1982).
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against undocumented children, who the court considered a
“discrete class,”103 Texas had to show that the law “further[ed] some
substantial state interest,” a burden the state could not meet.104
Building upon Plyler, Selene Vázquez has argued that undocumented children should actually be considered a suspect class
instead.105 Undocumented children should be viewed separately
from undocumented adults because they are not responsible for
their undocumented status.106 Rather, their legal status is a result
of “the violation of a third party and not their own volition.”107
Nonetheless, undocumented children still face the discrimination
and stereotyping historically directed toward immigrants,108 and
they are precluded from the political process because of their age
and legal status.109
Similarly, Heather McKay has advocated for transgender
students to be considered a quasi-suspect class for the purposes of
equal protection.110 Transgender individuals have suffered discrimination on many levels in the United States,111 especially during
their youth.112 Not only does federal law falsely associate being
transgender with disorders such as pedophilia,113 but transgender
employees have also faced an alarming amount of workplace
discrimination.114 Moreover, in addition to being too young to vote
themselves, evidence suggests that biases and misunderstandings
103. Id. at 220, 223 (describing the undocumented status as “a legal characteristic over
which children can have little control”).
104. Id. at 230. Such a burden most closely mirrors intermediate scrutiny, leading to the
inference that undocumented children are at least a quasi-suspect class. See supra notes 92-93
and accompanying text.
105. See Vázquez, supra note 85, at 104.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 82.
108. See id. at 96.
109. See id. at 99.
110. McKay, supra note 79, at 503.
111. Id. at 509.
112. Id. at 510-11 (“Transgender students ... face even more harassment in schools than
their gay, lesbian, and bisexual peers.”).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (establishing that the term “disability” does not include
“transsexualism, pedophilia ... gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders”); McKay, supra note 79, at 508 (arguing that
there is no evidence to prove a causal link between transgender identity and pedophilia).
114. McKay, supra note 79, at 509 (“When employers detect an applicant’s transgender
identity, it is not uncommon for them to refuse to interview or hire that applicant.”).
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might hinder parents and other adults from adequately representing the interests of transgender youths in the political process.115
Lastly, Spencer Klein has called for juvenile sex offenders to
receive heightened scrutiny.116 Through a joint analysis of both the
principles of Footnote Four and the four rationales behind the
judicial presumption that state and federal laws are constitutional,117 Klein argues that laws burdening juvenile sex offenders
should at least be reviewed under the “rational basis plus” level of
scrutiny.118
As the aforementioned examples illustrate, there are strong arguments for the expansion of suspect and quasi-suspect classes to
include groups of children who experience similar levels of prejudice and political powerlessness and who share certain immutable
traits.
C. Juvenile Offenders as a Suspect Class
It is crucial to reiterate that this Note maintains that juvenile
offenders tried as adults in Virginia must be considered a suspect
class in order to require judges to apply the principles of strict
scrutiny before sentencing. Therefore, the “class” at issue is limited
to juveniles in Virginia who have been transferred to the adult court
system. It is further assumed that these juveniles will go on to be
sentenced and thereby be considered “ex-offenders” upon release.
When analyzing whether this category of juveniles deserves suspect

115. Id. at 515-16.
116. Spencer Klein, Note, The New Unconstitutionality of Juvenile Sex Offender
Registration: Suspending the Presumption of Constitutionality for Laws that Burden Juvenile
Offenders, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2017). While juvenile sex offenders, on the surface,
meet the requirements to be a suspect class, such a classification has never been recognized
by courts. Id. at 1376-77.
117. See id. at 1378. Examination of the four rationales reveals that they do not apply to
laws that burden juvenile sex offenders. Id. at 1378-82. For example, one of the rationales,
the idea that laws are presumed to be constitutional because legislatures are democratically
accountable, is inapplicable because juvenile offenders have no say in a law’s passage. Id. at
1379. Thus, laws that burden juvenile sex offenders are not constitutional per se and require
heightened scrutiny. See id. at 1388.
118. Id. at 1389. Under “rational basis plus” scrutiny, “the existence of animus toward a
particular community overrides any rational basis that might exist for the legislation and
renders the law constitutionally invalid.” Id. at 1388-89.
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classification, this Note considers the suspect class factors119 as they
relate to the juveniles’ status as offenders being tried in adult court,
as well as the inevitability of their status as ex-offenders upon
release. As discussed below, the class’s immutable “trait”120 of being
labeled an ex-offender is especially significant in the face of arguments that age itself is not an immutable trait because all
juveniles do eventually turn eighteen.121
Having defined the exact constituents of the class at issue
(henceforth referred to simply as “juvenile offenders”), as well as the
factors that will be examined, this Note argues that this class of
juvenile offenders must be a protected, suspect class. To substantiate this claim, this Section explains how juvenile offenders (i) have
encountered prejudice or historical discrimination,(ii) are politically
powerless, and (iii) have defining immutable traits.122
1. Juvenile Offenders Have Faced Historical Discrimination
“[I]n order to be deemed suspect, the members of the class must
experience a history of discrimination.”123 There is no question juvenile offenders have faced a history of discrimination. There has
always been a stigma surrounding juveniles appearing in court.124
Such stigma initiated the development of juvenile courts catered to
the needs of children, where more measures were put in place to
protect juveniles’ privacy.125 Thus, even before sentencing, juvenile
offenders already face prejudice without serving a single minute of
their sentences. Such discrimination continues even after juveniles
exit the juvenile justice system.
119. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
120. McKay, supra note 79, at 505 (using the word “trait” to describe a quality that all
members of the suspect class possess).
121. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. To clarify, the other immutable “trait”
juvenile offenders possess is their inability to vote because of age.
122. See Vázquez, supra note 85, at 80; see also Geiger, supra note 88, at 1206.
123. McKay, supra note 79, at 505.
124. See Anne Rankin Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice
System: A Review of the Evidence, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 583, 583 (1974) (“Treatment-oriented
reformers ha[ve] been concerned for many years about the potentially harmful effects upon
individuals of arrest, court appearance, and incarceration.”).
125. Id. (describing the “efforts in the juvenile court to minimize stigmatization by having
informal procedures, hearings closed to the public and press, and limited access to court
records”).
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Ex-juvenile offenders experience multiple short- and long-term
consequences as a result of their contact with courts.126 Such youths
are more likely to be picked up by police officers for questioning if
an incident occurs within their neighborhoods.127 They are also
more likely to be dealt with harshly by judges if they make a reappearance in court.128 Even in school, juveniles labeled as delinquents are perceived less favorably by their classmates and
teachers.129 It is no wonder that studies have shown a negative association between being identified as a juvenile delinquent and
school performance.130 Eventually, when these youths grow older,
most experience the same barriers that adult ex-offenders face.131
Thus, juvenile offenders face a never-ending cycle of discrimination from the moment they walk through the courthouse doors.
Furthermore, discriminatory legal classifications that subordinate a specific group of individuals increase the likelihood that the
group is a suspect class.132 When juvenile offenders are released,
they inevitably take on a new identity as ex-offenders. Historically,
ex-offenders, as a class, have had many rights stripped away upon
their release from incarceration.133 For example, ex-offenders have
had their marriages automatically dissolved and many employment opportunities and other licenses automatically denied.134
However, the most enduring form of discrimination ex-offenders experience has been their historical disenfranchisement by the
states.135
When the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, more than threequarters of the states had provisions in their state constitutions
that explicitly prevented, or authorized the legislature to prohibit,

126. See id. at 597.
127. Id. at 598.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 600.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 598 (stating that ex-offenders face difficulties in obtaining licenses, jobs, and
even enlistment into the armed forces).
132. See Vázquez, supra note 85, at 94.
133. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
134. See Geiger, supra note 88, at 1225.
135. See id.
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people convicted of felonies from voting.136 The practice of felon disenfranchisement has pervaded modern society as well. As of 2021,
in twenty-one states felons lose their right to vote when they are
incarcerated.137 In sixteen states, felons are also disenfranchised for
a period of time after release.138 Furthermore, in eleven states,
felons lose their voting rights indefinitely after the commission of
specific types of crimes.139 The large number of laws that subject exoffenders to draconian penalties such as the loss of voting rights is
a strong reason why ex-offenders, regardless of age, must be considered a suspect class.140 When the unique history of prejudice that
juvenile offenders face in their schools and communities is considered as well,141 it is clear that juvenile offenders have faced historical discrimination that warrants suspect classification.
2. Juvenile Offenders Experience Political Powerlessness
To be awarded suspect classification, a group has to be “relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”142
Whether a group rises to the threshold of political powerlessness
depends on its status as a “discrete and insular minorit[y].”143 A
strong case can be made that juvenile offenders, as a class, qualify
as a discrete and insular minority.

136. Id. For example, when the California state constitution was adopted in 1879, there
was a provision authorizing the enactment of laws that excluded persons convicted of specific
crimes from voting. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 27 (1974).
137. Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 28, 2021), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/
NPV7-M9VC].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
141. See Mahoney, supra note 124, at 600.
142. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also McKay,
supra note 79, at 505 (stating that “isolat[ion] from the political process” is a factor used in
determining whether a group deserves suspect classification).
143. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Geiger,
supra note 88, at 1225; McKay, supra note 79, at 505.
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A class is discrete when its members are easily identifiable to
others due to a distinguishable trait.144 Children are easily recognized through common-sense observation. Juvenile offenders, by
virtue of being in the justice system, are also easily identifiable.
However, it may be argued that it is almost impossible to tell from
appearances alone whether a child is an ex-juvenile offender.145
Courts’ historical concern for and treatment of juvenile offenders,
however, rebukes this “invisibility” argument. Even in the 1970s,
when technology was less advanced, there were concerns that records of juvenile offenders were too easily accessible to employers
and interested parties, making ex-juvenile offenders easily identifiable.146 Youths who were involved in the justice system also reported feeling like their neighbors suspected them of committing
every subsequent offense in the area.147 Accordingly, courts went to
great lengths to maintain the privacy of juveniles within the justice
system.148 Such efforts suggest a strong desire by the public to seek
out juvenile offenders, further establishing the group’s discreteness.
The class’s insularity, on the other hand, is a trickier element to
prove. Whether a group is insular depends on the “tendency of group
members to interact with great frequency in a variety of social
contexts.”149 It is very unlikely that juveniles sentenced as adults
interact extensively with each other while in the court system, or
even after they are released from prison. Therefore, it is unclear
whether juvenile offenders qualify as an insular minority. It has
been argued, however, that insular groups actually possess more political clout than diffuse groups because their constant interaction
allows them to organize easily.150 Therefore, some political scientists
suggest that it is instead diffuse groups that should be awarded
heightened protection.151 As such, there is still disagreement as to
what exactly makes a group “discrete and insular.”152
144. See Geiger, supra note 88, at 1226.
145. See id. (”[T]here is no way to tell a formerly incarcerated person from a person without
a criminal history simply on the basis of appearance.”).
146. Mahoney, supra note 124, at 597.
147. Id. at 604.
148. See id. at 597 (stating that juvenile courtrooms are typically closed to visitors).
149. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 726 (1985).
150. See id. at 723-24; Geiger, supra note 88, at 1229.
151. See Ackerman, supra note 149, at 724.
152. Strauss, supra note 76, at 149 (emphasis omitted).
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Scholars have also suggested that a minority group is “discrete
and insular” if the group is “blocked from accessing the political
process” and its interests are unrepresented, thereby subjecting the
group to “unjustifiably heavy burdens” forced upon it by an “unthinking majorit[y].”153 Juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen
are not able to vote and are thereby removed from the political process entirely.154 On the surface, it seems like juvenile offenders are
the prototypical “discrete and insular” class because their age precludes them from taking political action to change sentencing laws
that unjustifiably burden them, or from voting out legislators who
appoint unfair judges. However, it has often been suggested that
children do not qualify as a discrete and insular minority because
their parents can vote for their interests on their behalf.155 While
this might be true for the average child, this belief might not apply
in the same way in regards to juvenile offenders.
There are several reasons why parents do not serve as proxies for
juvenile offenders in the political process. First, in arguing that
transgender youth should be a protected class, Heather McKay
explained that parents are generally ill-suited to represent the
interests of transgender children because of the biases toward
transgender youth and the general lack of acceptance by family
members.156 Similarly, it is unclear whether the parents of juvenile offenders actually represent their children’s interests in the
political sphere, especially if they are not ex-offenders themselves.
Moreover, studies have shown that 56 percent of juveniles taken into custody come from single-parent households, while 26 percent
were not living with any parent.157 This suggests that the bulk of
juvenile offenders have already lost representation from either one
or both of their alleged proxies in the political process.

153. Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless Searches
and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 152 (2007).
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
155. See, e.g., Worf, supra note 153, at 153; McKay, supra note 79, at 515.
156. McKay, supra note 79, at 515.
157. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE JUSTICE GUIDEBOOK FOR LEGISLATORS
1, 2 (2011), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-justice-guidebookfor-legislators.aspx [https://perma.cc/L4DE-YHLZ].
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Upon release, many ex-juvenile offenders also become homeless
or return to unstable housing situations,158 further adding to the
loss of adult representation. Studies also show that “a large percentage of violent juveniles have themselves been victims of serious
abuse or neglect” from their family members.159 Therefore, it is unlikely that many juvenile offenders have voting-age surrogates that
adequately represent their interests in the political system.
Accordingly, these young people are essentially powerless to
advocate against unduly burdensome sentencing laws or the appointment of unreasonable judges. Given Virginia’s long history of
felon disenfranchisement, it is very likely that ex-juvenile offenders
will remain politically powerless after they are released, even if
they are over the age of eighteen.160 Hence, there are compelling
reasons to conclude that juvenile offenders in Virginia are a politically powerless, discrete, and insular minority.
It is important to recognize the counterargument that the Equal
Protection Clause specifically contemplates and authorizes voting
restrictions against convicted criminals.161 In other words, the
Constitution allows states to render ex-offenders a politically
powerless group.162 However, as Ben Geiger contends, just because
the Framers approved of a group’s political disempowerment does
not mean that ex-offenders should not be given judicial protection
against laws that are prejudicial against them.163 Moreover, Footnote Four was written to protect suspect classes that have been
historically discriminated against, have an immutable trait, and
are politically powerless.164 Just because the Constitution appears
to accept political powerlessness in this case does not mean that exoffenders are any less deserving of suspect classification, especially
given the well-documented prejudice against them.165
158. Id. at 4 (stating that nearly half of homeless juveniles between the ages of ten and
seventeen were previously in a correctional facility).
159. Byron R. White, Remarks, Presentation of the Fordham-Stein Prize to Judge Gerald
Bard Tjoflat: October 31, 1996, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2412 (1997).
160. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
161. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974); see also Geiger, supra note 88, at
1231.
162. See Geiger, supra note 88, at 1232.
163. Id. at 1233-34.
164. See id. at 1234.
165. Id.
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Furthermore, it is also argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
is “generally forward looking, meaning that its interpretation reflects modern social values.”166 As more states restore felons’ right
to vote,167 perhaps felon disenfranchisement, though constitutionally
permissible, should be viewed as a form of legally sanctioned
discrimination, thereby awarding heightened protections to exoffenders.168
3. Juvenile Offenders Share Immutable Traits
The final factor in deciding whether a group merits suspect classification is the existence of an immutable, common trait among the
group.169 An immutable characteristic is one “determined solely by
the accident of birth.”170 Simply put, such a trait is unchangeable on
command, thereby requiring judicial protection if discrimination
occurs on account of that trait.171
In this case, the immutable traits that all juvenile offenders in
Virginia share are their youth, their status as offenders, and their
inability to vote as a result (even after turning eighteen). No child
chooses to be born in a certain year, and certainly no one is able to
choose their age at any given point. Juvenile offenders who decide
that sentencing laws unfairly burden them cannot miraculously
decide to be of voting age the next day. In the analogous case of undocumented children, the Supreme Court has deemed their undocumented status to be an immutable trait because it is “a legal
characteristic over which children can have little control.”172 Similarly, juveniles’ young age and the consequent inability to vote may
certainly be considered an uncontrollable “legal characteristic”173

166. Vázquez, supra note 85, at 90.
167. Felon Voting Rights, supra note 137 (“In 21 states, felons lose their voting rights only
while incarcerated, and receive automatic restoration upon release.”).
168. See Geiger, supra note 88, at 1234.
169. McKay, supra note 79, at 506.
170. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
171. McKay, supra note 79, at 506, 520 (explaining that the transgender trait is immutable
because it is “a core aspect of one’s self-definition”).
172. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
173. See id.
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because the voting age of eighteen is nothing more than an arbitrary
legal creation set forth in the Constitution.174
Scholars, however, have challenged whether youthfulness is an
“immutable” trait.175 Specifically, critics have asked if children can
really be considered an immutable class because their age will inevitably change over time.176 In fact, the Supreme Court has held
that old age “marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out
our normal span,” thereby suggesting that age-based traits should
not be used to classify a group as suspect.177
However, this debate does not exactly pertain to juvenile offenders as it does to regular youths. First, to address the Court’s
holding that old age is not a trait to be considered for suspect
classification, short of the ability to purchase alcohol,178 there are no
meaningful burdens enacted by law, purely on the basis of age, after
the age of eighteen. In other words, it matters more that someone
is under the age of eighteen than it does if someone is elderly because the underaged cannot participate in the political process to
change laws that nonetheless affect them heavily. Second, even if all
juvenile offenders eventually turn eighteen, the difficulties associated with expungement mean that many juvenile offenders live
with the “ex-offender” label for life.179 The ex-offender label is yet
another defining, immutable trait that juvenile offenders possess.
As ex-offenders, these individuals are still unable to vote in many
states, even if they are over the age of eighteen when they are
released.180 Specifically, the Constitution of Virginia states that
“[n]o person who has been convicted of a felony shall be qualified to
vote unless his [or her] civil rights have been restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority.”181 The typical process for
restoration is by application to the governor or by petition to the
courts, both of which can be challenging.182
174. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
175. See Strauss, supra note 76, at 163.
176. Id.
177. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam).
178. See 23 U.S.C. § 158(a).
179. See Geiger, supra note 88, at 1219, 1224.
180. See Felon Voting Rights, supra note 137.
181. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
182. See Felon Voting Rights, supra note 137. For example, in 2016, the Virginia Supreme
Court further specified that restoration cannot happen en masse, but rather only on an
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While it may be argued that some ex-offenders in Virginia do
eventually get their voting rights restored, the wait is often long
and arduous.183 Most juvenile offenders wait years before their
voting rights are restored.184 Hence, even after turning eighteen,
ex-offenders’ status (which results in an inability to vote) might
continue to be an uncontrollable legal characteristic that unduly
burdens juvenile offenders.
Such a conclusion closely mirrors arguments made to treat undocumented children as a suspect class.185 These arguments state
that the legal status of undocumented children “prevents them from
... voting for a representative that will consider their interests,”186
even when they reach the required age. Similarly, even if one
questions the immutability of youth, there is good reason to believe
that juvenile offenders in Virginia will still be unable to vote due to
their immutable status as felons.
Since juvenile offenders fulfill all three factors187 that warrant
suspicion, they should be awarded suspect classification. Consequently, judges in Virginia must apply the principles of strict
scrutiny when sentencing a juvenile in adult court.
IV. APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY DURING JUVENILE SENTENCING
Under the proposed framework, for judges in Virginia to stay true
to the principles of strict scrutiny, sentences must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.188
individual basis. Id.
183. See Holly Prestidge, ‘Never Too Late:’ Virginia Woman Votes for the First Time, WASH.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/nov/8/never-too-latevirginia-woman-votes-for-the-first-/ [https://perma.cc/2SEF-8URR] (telling the story of a
Virginian who waited “decades” to restore her voting rights).
184. See id. In 2016, Republican legislators in Virginia successfully challenged the Democrat governor’s blanket restoration of voting rights, indicating that progress towards felon
reenfranchisement remains an uphill battle in the politically divided Commonwealth. See
Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 723-25 (Va. 2016) (finding Governor McAuliffe’s blanket
restoration of voting rights to be unconstitutional); see also Gary Robertson, Virginia High
Court Hears Republican Voting-Rights Lawsuit, REUTERS (July 19, 2016, 6:08 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-virginia-felons-idUSKCN0ZZ0Z5 [https://perma.cc/48U7-8WEL].
185. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
186. Vázquez, supra note 85, at 99.
187. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
188. See Bedi, supra note 10, at 303.
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A survey of current scholarship reveals some arguments for
subjecting criminal sentences to strict scrutiny. For example, Salil
Dudani argues that criminal sentences should be subject to strict
scrutiny because criminal confinement infringes upon the fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.189 Therefore, any
criminal sentence that is “not necessary to serve a compelling
government interest violates” the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.190 Put differently, to pass constitutional muster,
courts must decide whether the sentence is the least restrictive
way to promote the government’s interests in subjecting individuals to incarceration.191 Similarly, this Note argues that judges in
Virginia must apply the principles of strict scrutiny when sentencing a juvenile tried in adult court, but rests its argument on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause instead.
A. Determining a Compelling Governmental Interest
For a sentence to pass strict scrutiny, there must first be a compelling governmental interest that is served by the sentence.192 The
Supreme Court has identified several justifications for prison
sentences: (i) retribution, (ii) deterrence, (iii) rehabilitation, and
(iv) incapacitation.193
First, retribution cannot be the state’s compelling interest in
putting juvenile offenders behind bars. The Court has held “that the
distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,
even when they commit terrible crimes.”194 Because of youths’ “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” blameworthiness for the harshest crimes, which is the
main rationale for retribution, cannot apply in the same way to
juveniles as it does to adults.195
189. See Salil Dudani, Unconstitutional Incarceration: Applying Strict Scrutiny to Criminal
Sentences, 129 YALE L.J. 2112, 2117-18 (2020).
190. Id. at 2118.
191. Id. at 2136.
192. See Bedi, supra note 10, at 303.
193. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003).
194. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012).
195. Id. at 472, 477.
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Likewise, the goal of deterrence, which is contingent upon actors
rationally considering the punishments from potential offenses
before following through, does not apply to juveniles because they
are “less likely to consider potential punishment” due to their “immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity.”196 The same logic applies
to general deterrence as well. It is highly plausible that even if juveniles are aware of others receiving harsh sentences, “they are less
likely to take a possible punishment into consideration.”197 Accordingly, deterrence is unlikely to be a compelling interest for incarcerating youths.
Rehabilitation is also unlikely to be the compelling governmental
interest in sentencing juveniles in adult court. Commentators have
argued that the primary purpose of the juvenile justice system is
rehabilitation.198 Hence, if the government’s interest in creating the
juvenile justice system is to promote rehabilitation, it may be implied that transferring a juvenile offender to adult court means that
rehabilitation is no longer the primary goal of the sentence.
Finally, with regards to incapacitation, the Court has held that
incapacitation cannot be the governmental interest supporting a
juvenile LWOP sentence because a juvenile cannot possibly be a
danger to society forever, unless the youth is “incorrigible” and
incapable of change.199 Thus, “criminal procedure laws that fail to
take ... youthfulness into account” are inherently flawed.200 However, having eliminated retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation
for stronger reasons, this Note argues that, to apply the principles
of strict scrutiny when sentencing juveniles in Virginia adult courts,
LWOP sentences aside, the only acceptable compelling governmental interest is incapacitation. Such a position is further supported by Supreme Court precedent reaffirming the compelling state

196. See id. at 472.
197. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010).
198. See, e.g., Andrea Huerta, Comment, Juvenile Offenders: Victims of Circumstance with
a Potential for Rehabilitation, 12 FIU L. REV. 187, 216 (2016) (“States should begin by refocusing the juvenile justice system to reflect its originally intended purpose ... focuse[d] on
individualized rehabilitation.”).
199. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472-73 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 72-73).
200. Id. at 473-74 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 76).
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interest in protecting society from the dangers of crimeɆthe goal of
incapacitation201Ɇregardless of the age of the perpetrator.202
Having identified that the government’s compelling interest in
sentencing juvenile offenders in adult court is incapacitation, this
Part proceeds to analyze how Virginia judges may impose sentences
that are narrowly tailored to serve the interest of incapacitation.
B. Determining a Narrowly Tailored Sentence
A sentence is narrowly tailored if it is both necessary and its
duration is no longer than required to realize the government’s
compelling interest.203 In other words, “where alternatives to confinement would suffice to meet the government’s interests, confinement is unconstitutional.”204 Practically speaking, a sentence is
narrowly tailored to promote the incapacitation of juvenile offenders
when it is “necessary, based on all the evidence, to prevent the
individual from causing serious harm during or after the sentence.”205 There are various alternatives to incarceration that
promote incapacitation, such as GPS monitoring, home detention,
and community supervision.206 Under the right circumstances,
Virginia judges must consider these alternatives. As mentioned,
however, juveniles being tried in adult court typically come from
violent environments themselves,207 and the suggested alternatives
might not be effective in most cases.
Therefore, when deciding upon the necessity and length of sentences, empirical evidence must predominantly inform the ruling.208
The Court held in Miller that a juvenile’s immaturity and impetuosity, home and family environment, and extent of participation in the
actual offense, as well as the role of peer pressure, are all factors to
consider before sentencing a juvenile offender.209 Therefore, for a

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003).
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1984).
Dudani, supra note 189, at 2119.
Id.
Id. at 2145.
See id.
See White, supra note 159, at 2412.
See Dudani, supra note 189, at 2145.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).
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sentence to be narrowly tailored, judges must take all of these additional factors into account and evaluate how they promote the
interest of incapacitation.
Perhaps, in cases where juveniles were not a significant part of
the offense but were peer pressured into being at the scene, the
prison sentence should only incapacitate the juvenile long enough
to prevent them from immediately reconnecting with those peers
and getting into the same trouble. In cases where juveniles acted
alone, the juvenile’s age and immaturity, as well as empirical evidence of when individuals typically “‘age out’ of crime,” should be
jointly considered to determine the appropriate length of incapacitation.210
For the most extreme displays of juveniles failing to comprehend
the risks associated with their offenses, perhaps a professionally
administered psychological examination should be conducted to
determine whether the youth is facing a developmental issue that
will be eradicated in time. If so, the sentence should only be for the
length of time appropriate to prevent the juvenile from causing
more harm to others due to his or her lack of judgment. Limiting the
length of time that juveniles remain in the adult criminal system
benefits society as well, since a juvenile offender who is tried in
adult court is 34 percent more likely to be rearrested for a felony
than a juvenile who is not transferred from the juvenile justice
system.211
While HB 744 already requires judges to make similar considerations before sentencing a juvenile as an adult,212 applying the
principles of strict scrutiny provides additional guidance by tying
such considerations to the goal of incapacitation. This means that
Virginia judges have to use a juvenile’s individual circumstances to
craft the most necessary form of punishment that promotes the
interest of incapacitation. Such guidance provides much clarity to
HB 744’s otherwise ambiguous mandate to consider mitigating
factors, and it dissuades judges from burying their prejudices under

210. Dudani, supra note 189, at 2146 (stating that after their mid-twenties, very few
juvenile offenders still engage in criminal activity).
211. Huerta, supra note 198, at 219.
212. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(D) (2020).
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a merely performative “consideration” of the juvenile’s unique
situation.
While the proposed standard significantly protects juveniles tried
as adults, some may object to its impact on judicial expediency.
Indeed, though it may take longer for judges to decide on sentences,
the additional time is worthwhile, particularly given heightened
scrutiny is likely to reduce juvenile incarceration rates.213 No
amount of waiting should be more important than securing a child’s
freedom. Others may also argue that the proposed standard will
negatively impact taxpayers due to increases in judicial spending.
However, if the standard successfully lowers juvenile incarceration,
the government may actually save on costly prison sentences.214
Therefore, while these objections are valid, the positives generated
by the proposed standard significantly outweigh the negatives.
C. Appellate Review of Sentences Under HB 744
This Note maintains that if a juvenile offender believes that his
or her sentence does not conform with the principles of strict
scrutiny, he or she may appeal their sentence to higher courts in
Virginia. Under this framework, appellate judges must use strict
scrutiny to review all sentences because juvenile offenders make up
a suspect class. This is in line with the spirit of Carolene Products’
Footnote Four, which calls for courts to protect discrete and insular
minorities who are unable to protect themselves through the political process.215
While this Note provides trial judges with guidance over the
judicial principles that must be applied during juvenile sentencing,
in reality, the true protection of juvenile offenders will come from
appellate judges and their duty to strike down sentences that are
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
This is especially important because juvenile offenders cannot vote
out the legislators responsible for passing laws like HB 744, nor can
they vote out legislators who approve the appointments of unfair
trial judges.
213. See Dudani, supra note 189, at 2175.
214. Id.; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
215. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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Practically speaking, what this means for judges in Virginia is
that after a juvenile tried in adult court is sentenced under HB 744,
he or she may appeal the sentence as an unconstitutional violation
of the right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the appellate level, the appropriate standard of review to be
applied by judges is strict scrutiny. If judges apply the principles of
strict scrutiny as suggested in this Note, they would retain their
discretionary powers awarded under HB 744, while preserving the
protections offered to juvenile offenders under Carolene Products’
Footnote Four.
CONCLUSION
This Note began by painting a grim picture of the nation’s “tough
on crime” era. However, after the Miller trilogy, meaningful reform
started to occur across the country.216 In particular, the Commonwealth of Virginia led the nation by becoming the first state to allow
judges to veer away from the mandatory minimum sentence for
juveniles tried in adult court.217 Nonetheless, this Note maintains
that Virginia’s new law does not go far enough to protect juvenile
offenders. Instead, juvenile offenders in adult court must be awarded heightened scrutiny because they are a suspect class under Carolene Products Footnote Four.
Accordingly, judges in Virginia, as a matter of judicial policy,
have to apply the principles of strict scrutiny when sentencing
juveniles in accordance with HB 744. In doing so, judges have to ask
if their sentences are narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest. If such principles are not applied, it is very
likely that the sentence will be struck down on appeal. Therefore,
the judicial principles submitted by this Note serve as the first layer

216. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
217. See Watts, supra note 8.

1796

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1765

of protection over the rights of juvenile offenders, while preserving
the balance between judicial discretion and the fundamental principles embodied in Footnote Four. In the future, if other states pass
legislation similar to HB 744, they should provide specific language
that requires judges in their states to apply the principles of strict
scrutiny when deciding upon adult sentences for juveniles.
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